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WILLS-CONTRACT TO DEVISE-ACTION TO ENFORCE-ADMINISTRATOR AS PARTY-ATTORNEY OF ADMINISTRATOR AP-

McCabe v. Healy, 70 PaC. R. ioo8
(Io2).-This is a rather interesting case decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1902. The facts of the case are
briefly as follows: Matthew Healy was engaged in the stockraising business in California in the year 1881 and for many
years prior thereto. He had no relatives in the United States.
In I88i he returned to his old home in Ireland to visit his sisters, having been away for thirty-seven years. The plaintiff,
Ulty McCabe, was then a boy of fourteen years residing with his
mother, Healy's sister, the father being dead. Healy took a
fancy to the boy, and this led him to verbally agree with the boy
and the boy's mother and guardian that if they would surrender
the boy to his control and care, and if the boy would accompany
him to California and there accept his care, instruction, and direction, and industriously learn and care for his (Healy's) busiPEARING FOR PLAINTIFF.
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ness, property, and interests as long as Healy lived, he would
take good care of the boy, treat him as his son, -and "upon his
death -he should have all property of every character wheresoever situated that Healy should own at the time of his death,
and that he would will the boy all his estate." ' McCabe, the
plaintiff, in accordance with this agreement accompahied Healy
back to California, and the two there kept faith to the full letter
of the understanding. The plaintiff managed Healy's interests
well and substantially performed his part of the contract.
Healy, however, died intestate., This was a suit against Healy's
heirs-at-law for specific performance of the contract and' to
obtain a decree that the title of the property of Healy was in
the plaintiff. The court considered that the plaintiff was
equitably entitled to the estate and made a decree accordingly.
Such a case as this is not of infrequent occurrence and so the
decision is of some importance. It raises many nice points and
objections which are discussed at length by the'judge in reaching his conclusion. It is well to review and consider them
systematically.
i. Right to make contract to devise. This is unquestioned.
In Johnson v. Hubbel, io N. J. Eq. 332 (1855), it is said:
"There can be no doubt but that a person may make a valid
agreement binding himself legally to make a particular disposition of his property by last will and testament. The law
permits a man to dispose of his own property at his pleasure,
and no good reason can be assigned why he may not make a
legal agreement to dispose of his property to a particular individual or for a particular purpose as well by will as by conveyance to be made at some specified future period or upon the
happening of some future event." Pomeroy on Specific Performance is to "the same effect, where it is expressed thus:
"Courts of Equity will under special circumstances enforce a
contract to make a will or to make a certain testamentary disposition; and this may be done even when the agreement was
parol where, in reliance upon the contract, the promisee has
changed his condition and relations so that a refusal to complete the agreement would be a fraud on him. The relief is
granted not by ordering a will made, but by regarding the
property in the hands of the heirs, devisees, assignees, or representatives of the deceased promissor as impressed with a trust
in favor of the plaintiff and by compelling the defendafit, who
must belong to some one of these classes of persons, to make
such disposition or conveyance of the property as will carry
out the intent of the agreement." A man might renounce
every power, benefit, or right which the law gives him, and he
will be bound by his agreement to do so provided the agreement
be entered into fairly, without surprise, imposition, or fraud,
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and that it be reasonable and moral. Rivers v. Executors of
Rivers, 3 Desaus. Eq. (S. Car.) 195 (I8II).
2. The Consideration. This in the typical case is the care
and protection of the testator till his death and the services
incident thereto. The argument is usually advanced that the
plaintiff can be compensated for his services in- money, and
so the decree should not be granted, but the plaintiff be left to
his remedy on a quantum meruit. But it can be answered, and
is so answered in the cases on the subject, that, first, it was
not the intention of the parties to the contract that the services
of the plaintiff, or the consideration for the promise, should be
compensated in money; and, secohdly, that it is impossible to
estimate the value of such services by a pecuniary standard.
In Brinton v. Van Cott, 8 Utah, 33 (i892), a similar case, it is
said': "The services rendered were of such a peculiar character
that it would be exceedingly difficult and probably impossible
to estirihate their value to the deceased by anypecuniary standard. It was not the intention to measure such services by a
pecuniary standard." Again, in Burns v. Smith, 53 Pac. 742
(1898) :" Parties cannot be put in statu quo. The disposition
claimed is carrying out the cherished intention of the deceased
in relation to the plaintiff. In the very nature of things, nine
years in the life of a child so change conditions that it is out
of the power .of an earthly tribunal to restore the parties to
-their original situation and environment, and courts therefore
compel them to stand upon and abide by the record they have
made.'?

But it must be further considered that if the consideration
be slight, so as to make the contract apparently unfair, specific
performance will'be denied, for to entitle one to such a ,decree
the contract must be fair, just, and equitable in all its parts.
The consideration must be deemed adequate by the court. This
is strongly upheld in Woods v. Evans, 113 Ill. 188 (i885).
There the plaintiff was an infant orphan-imate of a charitable
organization., Short, a married man possessed of property
worth $2o,oo, with the consent of the institution contracted
with the plaintiff that if she would enter his service and live
with him till she should become eighteen (a period of seven
years), and during all that time faithfully serve and obey him
as a good, 'orderly. servant and as a dutiful child should, he, in
consideration thereof, undertook to take her from the institution,
adopt her in his family, support, maintain, and educate her, and
leave her at his death a child's share of his estate. The court
in its opinion says: "The services agreed to be rendered hert
could 'in no sense be regarded as equivalent for the property
agreed to 'be given. It is plain to any person of ordinary intelligeiice that the support and education would fully, compensate
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the plaintiff for all the services agreed to be rendered, but, notwithstanding this, if a specific performance of the contract set
out in the bill should be decreed, she will receive in addition to
what she has already received quite a large fortune. Under
such circumstances, can the contract be regarded as fair and
just in all its parts?" And on this ground, together with
another ground to be considered infra, specific performance was
denied. See also Ikerd v. Beavers, io6 Ind. 483 (1886).
3. Terms of the contract must be definite, certain, and clearly
proven. The contract must be established by direct and positive proof and wthout conflicting evidence--definite as to the
property to be given and the services to be rendered. And the
reason for this appears in this sentence from the American and
English Encyclopedia: "Parol agreements to make specific testamentary provision have been a source of difficulty to the
courts. Courts listen reluctantly to verbal statements of what
dead men have said." And again: " Claims of this nature
against dead men's estate resting entirely on parol, based largely
on loose declarations, presented in some cases years after the
services were rendered and when the lips of the party principally interested are closed in death, require the closest and
most careful scrutiny to prevent injustice being done." Wall's
Appeal, iii Pa. 460 (i886). So that we see that the courts
require strict proof; but when the evidence clearly establishes
a plain, definite contract, and a substantial performance on the
promisee's part, they will not hesitate to make the decree sought.
So a promise in consideration of service to give the plaintiff " as much as any relation on earth" or "a share with all my
nephews at my last" have been considered too indefinite to be
enforced. " Such claims are always dangerous, and when they
rest on parol evidence they should be strictly scanned. Especially when an attempt is made under cover of a parol contract
to effect a distribution different from that which the law makes
or that which decedent has directed by his will, should it meet
with no favor in a court of law. Even if any such contract
may be in force, it dan only be when it is clearly proved by
direct and positive testimony and when its terms are definite
and certain." Graham v. Graham's Executors, 34 Pa. 475
(1859).
So "if you will move to my farm and take care of and support me during my lifetime, I will convey to you in a reasonable
time a certain piece of land" has been likewise'held too indefinite
and unfair, as the quality of support to be furnished is wholly
in the discretion of the plaintiff. Ikerd v. Beavers -(supra).
Nor is this sufficiently definite: "Don't be discouraged; you
shall be paid for all your hard work. I will leave you this
place." Bash v. Bash, 9 Pa. 260 (1848). Moreover, in that
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case it is said, "It is error to instruct the jury that it is suffident if the evidence is clear and satisfactory-it must be direct
and positive."
Courts have refused to enforce a contract of this kind, "I
will provide for you so that you will never want during your
life," for it can be seen at a glance that this is- hopelessly uncertain. Wail's Appeal (supra). But a contract to devise "a
child's share" is sufficiently certain. Healy v. Simpson, I 13
Mo. 340 (1892).
As to proof of the contract, the testimony of two witnesses
that the testatrix promised to remember the plaintiff in her
Will and to provide for her when she died in consideration of
certain household services has been held insufficient to establish a contract to make a will in favor of the plaintiff. Newton's Executors v. Field,98 Ky. 186 (1895).
4. The applicability of the Statute of Frauds to such contracts. These contracts being such as relate to the transfer of
land, naturally the point is raised that the contract is within
the Statute of Frauds, which requires such contracts to be in
writing, and that, resting entirely on parol evidence, they cannot
be enforced. While most. of the courts seem to consider the
contract one to which the statute is applicable (see Alerding v.
Allison, 68 N. E. 185, a very recent decision), yet they get
around this difficulty on the ground that the services having
been rendered when the suit is brought, there has been such a
part performance as to take the contract out of the working of
the statute, for in most of these cases the plaintiff's part is
substantially performed and all that remains to be done is the
defendant's obligation-viz., to make the transfer.
"An agreement by a man and wife to adopt the plaintiff as
their child and provide and care for her and leave her their
property at their death is taken out of the operation of the
Statute of Frauds when the plaintiff has fully performed the
contract on her part by living with and obeying them as parents
and paying them her wages." Sharkey v. McDermott, 91 Mo.
647 (1887), following Wright v. Tinsley, 30 Mo. 389 (i86o).
Accord, Brown v. Sutton, 129 U. S. 238 (1889). Contra,
Wallace v. Long, 105 Ind. 525 (1886), where the plaintiff was
left to his remedy on a quantum meruit.
5.Contract must not interfere with rights of innocent third
parties. This proposition is supported by the case of Owens'v.
McNally, 113 Cal. 444 (1896). There the plaintiff agreed to
leave her home and accompany the defendant to California and
live with him and care for him, .he to .will her his property.
Subsequent to the agreement he married. After remarking
that the contract was rather vague and uncertain the court continued: "The complainant has a right to the protection of this

NOTES.

court and its aid in protecting her rights, but if that protection
and aid cannot be afforded him without invadihg and disregarding the rights of others, this court may not, in 'its anxiety and
desire to relieve one party, inflict a wrong and injury upon
another entirely innocent in the transaction." The widow was
ignorant of-the contract till the death of her husband and so
her rights cannot be swept aside, but the plaintiff will be
relegated to a quantum meruit. This is analogous to the revocation of a will by change of the testator's circumstances.
" Courts will not enforce the specific performance of a contract at the instance of a vendor where his title is involved in
difficulties which cannot be removed or where it would not be
equitable to make such a decree." This applies to a contract to
devise land as well as a contract to sell land. Johnson v. Hubbell (supra).
It would perhaps be proper, at this time, to make clear on
just what grounds the relief desired in such a case is granted.
It is succinctly stated as follows: "The general principle to
be extracted from the authorities is that if the plaintiff with the
knowledge and consent of the promissor does acts pursuant to
and in obvious reliance upon a verbal agreement, which so
change the relation of the parties as to render a restoration
of their former condition impracticable, it is a virtual fraud
upon the part of the promissor to set up the statute in defence
and thus to receive to himself the benefit of acts done by the
plaintiff, while the latter is left to the chance of a suit at law for
reimbursement for the value of his outlays, or to an action on a
quantum ineruit for the value of his services." Townsend v.
Vanderwerkes; 16o U. S. 171 (1895).

The above-mentioned points are those usually raised and discussed in a case of such a nature, and as in the case at hand all
such conditions were satisfied, the contract being fair, certain,
and clearly proven, with the rights of no innocent third parties
intervening and the plaintiff having substantially performed his
part, the decree was rightly granted. The case is undoubted
law and would be followed in nearly all jurisdictions. There
are some seemingly discordant cases which have been cited as
conflicting with the principle laid down in this case, but these
can mostly be distinguished as not complying with all of the
above conditions.
Cox v. Cox,_26 Grattan (Va.) 305 (1875), is distinguishable,
as there the plaintiff died before the defendant and so did not
complete his part of the contract, which required services until
the defendant's death.
The judge in Spr mnkle v. Hayworth, 26 Grattan, 384 (1875),
seemed to see several difficulties: I. That a written instrument
cannot be varied by parol. But this is misconceived, as the

400

NOTES.

evidence was not to vary the will but to establish an independent
contract. The will is subject to all contracts and liabilities of
the testator before made, and in proving them you cannot be
said to be varying the will. 2. That it would be allowing parol
wills. This will hardly hold water, as it is a distinct contract
and not a will that is being established.
Where the defendant becomes insane, naturally he could not
make the desired will, and so the plaintiff should be restricted
to a quantum reruit. Hudson v. Hudson, 87 Ga. 678 (089).
Maddison v. Alderson, L. R. 8 Ap. Cas. 467 (1883), frequently cited, does not conflict, As the Court there says, "I do
not see that we have before us that certain proof of the agreement which authorities appear to require." It was a case, as
they styled it, of "vague anticipation."
A minor point was raised and decided in the case in hand.
The administrator of Healy was not a party to the suit and it
was objected to on that ground. The Code of Civil Procedure
provided, "Any person may be made a defendant who has a
claim or interest in the controversy adverse to the plaintiff or
who is a necessary party to a complete determination of the
question involved therein." Necessary parties are those without whom a valid decree cannot be made, so that clearly'the
administrator was not needed. He had no interest thereinthe question being wholly between the heirs. The administrator in such a case is a mere stakeholder. His duty is to preserve the estate and distribute it as the court directs. Accord,
Roach v. Coffey, 73 Cal. 281 (1887).
And following this decision the court have no difficulty in
allowing the attorney for the administrator to appear for the
plaintiff, which would not be allowed if the administrator were
an adverse party to the suit.
F.G.S.

